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Abstract
Political regimes and institutions di®er across countries. Such char-
acteristics in°uence public spending within each country. The aim of
this paper is to check for the existence of a link between political institu-
tions, income inequality and public spending. We develop an empirical
investigation, based on panel data analysis, on the determinants of pub-
lic spending focusing on political, economic, demographic and social
variables in large sample of developed and developing countries from
1970 to 2005. In particular, we focus on the e®ects of electoral rules
on government consumption ¯nding that in countries with proportional
electoral rule an increase in the heterogeneity of the government in-
creases government consumption, while in countries with majoriratian
electoral rule, a shift from presidential to parliamentary system leads to
an increase in government consumption. We ¯nd that the link between
income distribution, measured by the Gini index, and public spending
depends upon institutional characteristics. Moreover, we ¯nd empiri-
cal support for the argument that government spending is a policy tool
used by governments to insurance the domestic economy from external
shocks stemming from international trade.
¤We are grateful to Emilio Colombo and seminars participants at the University of Milan-
Bicocca for useful comments and insightful discussions.
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The quality and the quantity of public spending is in°uenced by di®erent po-
litical, social and economic determinants. The aim of this work is to study
whether di®erences in political systems, voting rules and income distribution
generate di®erent government consumption decisions. The present work pro-
vides an accurate way to model government institutional heterogeneity, high-
lighting the role of income distribution in shaping government spending poli-
cies.
The literature has extensively studied the e®ect of political institutions
and electoral systems on public spending. The theoretical paper by Lizzeri
and Persico (2001) suggests the existence of a trade-o® between e±ciency and
targetability of public spending showing that proportional systems are more
e±cient when public goods are very valuable and winner-take-all systems are
more e±cient when public goods are not very valuable. In the empirical work
by Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno (2002) electoral systems are funda-
mental in order to determine how governments provide public goods. They
show that since under proportional rule the government represents di®erent
groups and it is di±cult to target public goods on their preferences, non-local
public goods (i.e. transfer in cash, subsidies, pensions) are preferred. On the
other hand, under winner-take-all rule the government is expected to represent
one group (or, at least, homogeneous groups) and public goods targetability
is easier, hence local public goods (i.e. schools, hospitals, etc.) are preferred.
Persson and Tabellini (2003) study the economic e®ects of constitutions con-
sidering how a country reacts to unobserved common events in terms of gov-
ernment spending and welfare spending taking into account political, economic
and social variables.
The present paper di®ers from existing studies and in particular from the
signi¯cant contributions of Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno (2002) and
Persson and Tabellini (2003) under many aspects. First of all, other than con-
sidering di®erent country samples on the basis of electoral rule as previously
done in the empirical literature, we also control for the e®ect of the distribution
of seats within each government through the Her¯ndahl Government Index.
This measure allows us to analyze how the degree of government fragmenta-
tion may a®ect public spending even within the same electoral system. There
are countries with proportional rule and low fragmentation (and vice versa)
and the empirical strategy followed by Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno
(2002) cannot give an answer on their preference for local or non-local public
goods. Our twofold focus on the electoral dimension (the distinction between
proportional and electoral rules and the ability to control for government frag-
mentation) allows us to distinguish between fragmented and non-fragmented
2governments also within the two main subsamples of countries characterized
by di®erent electoral systems.1 As a consequence of our methodology, we are
able to discuss if electoral rule and/or government fragmentation determines
the preference for public spending. Second, we emphasize the role of income
inequality. The e®ect of income distribution on public spending has been
explored in the literature with controversial results. On the one hand, the
theoretical works by Metzeler and Richard (1981) and Persson and Tabellini
(1994, 2000) suggest that income skewness raises public spending, on the other
hand, the empirical analysis by Lindert (1996) shows that income inequality
lowers total public expenditure, while the theoretical work by Gregorini (2009)
suggests that, if income inequality increases, it would be optimal to lower pub-
lic expenditure. From the methodological point of view, our analysis of the
e®ect of income inequality di®ers with respect to Persson and Tabellini (2000).
While they consider income inequality (measured by Gini Index) as a constant
using the average of the observations closest to 1980 and the observations clos-
est to 1990, we consider the Gini Index exploiting also its time variation in a
panel data framework based on annual observations. Moreover, we have been
able to collect data for a higher number of countries (and more heterogeneous
ones) with respect to the existing literature on this topic.
We ¯nd that in countries with proportional electoral rule an increase in
the heterogeneity of the government increases government consumption. The
second important ¯nding relates to the e®ect of the political system on pub-
lic spending. In particular, for countries with majoriratian electoral rule, a
shift from presidential to parliamentary system leads to an increase in gov-
ernment consumption. With our analysis we are also able to explain that
the link between income inequality and public spending depends upon insti-
tutional characteristics, in particular on the electoral rule in force. We ¯nd
that while income inequality does not in°uence government spending decisions
in winner-take-all systems, there is a positive relationship between the Gini
index and government consumption in countries with proportional electoral
rule. Controlling for a number of demographic country characteristics we ¯nd
that in countries with proportional electoral rule an increase in the popula-
tion is associated with a decrease in government consumption, as it happens
when the share of elderly people increases. On the contrary, a higher share of
working-age individuals leads to a reduction in government consumption. In
addition our results support the argument proposed by Rodrik (1998) accord-
ing to which governments tend to protect their domestic economies from the
risk associated to international trade. In fact, we ¯nd government consumption
1Table 7 classi¯es each country according to the combination of their election rule (pro-
portional or majoritarian) and political system (parliamentary or presidential).
3to be positively related to a measure of external risk.
The paper is organized as follows. The next session describes the dataset
and gives a detailed explanation of the variables used in the empirical analysis.
Section 3 presents some descriptive statistics explaining the relationship be-
tween the main explanatory variables and government consumption and gives
some predictions on the behavior of the main regressors. Section 4 explains
the econometric methodology applied in the empirical analysis while results
are shown in section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Dataset and variables description
Our empirical investigation is based on a data-set of a large number of devel-
oped and developing countries over the period 1970-2005. Table 6 and table
9 in the Appendix provide the list of countries included in the analysis and
some descriptive statistics of the main variables included in our study. Eco-
nomic and demographic data are taken from the World Bank WDI data-set.
Political variables come from di®erent sources such as the Database of Political
Institutions (DPI) created by Beck et al. (2002), the Freedom House and La
Porta et al. (1999), while data on income inequality come from the WIID2
database. Table 1 provides a brief description of the explanatory variables.
Table 8 shows some systematic relationships between some economic and so-
cial country characteristics such us per-capita income, demography, openness
to international trade, the degree of civil liberties and the two aspects of the
political environment on which we focus our analysis: the electoral rule and
the form of government.
2.1 Dependent variable
We want to analyse the e®ect of a country institutional characteristics on the
size of its government. We proxy government size by the general government
¯nal consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP (Govcon). This mea-
sure includes all government current expenditures for purchases of goods and
services including compensation of employees, most expenditures on national
defense and security, but excludes government military expenditures.2 Figure
1 shows the averages of government consumption over decades for the entire
country sample and for a sample restricted to OECD countries. The increase
in government consumption in OECD countries from the seventies to the eight-
ies, might be due to an increase in welfare spending following economic shocks
2Government military expenditures are part of government capital formation.
4due to oil price. From the 80s, government consumption appears to be increas-
ing in OECD countries and fairly stable worldwide. This might represent a
consequence of the economic crisis experienced during the early 90s and the
reaction of governments to the introduction of budget constraints coming from
international authorities, like the "Stability and Growth Pact" for many Euro-
pean countries 3, and pressures from international agencies, such as the IMF,
to keep government spending under control.
2.2 Inequality, political rules and forms of government
Government fragmentation. We proxy it by the Her¯ndhal index for gov-
ernment (Herfgov) which represents a measure of concentration of the ruling
coalition. This measure is obtained by the sum of the squared seat shares of all
parties in the government and thus it indicates how the seats in the parliament
are distributed within the government coalition. In case of single-party gov-
ernments the index equals 1, while in case of government coalitions the index






where si represents the share of seats held by each party supporting the gov-
ernment with respect to the total seats held by government parties.
Typically, the higher the number of parties within the coalition, the lower
the value of the Index. Furthermore, there is an inverse relationship between
the disproportionality of seats shares between parties belonging to government
coalition and the value of the Index. Thus, the presence of a dominant party
within a coalition increases the value of the Index. This variable allows us
to distinguish not only between proportional and majority systems but it also
gives us information on the degree of proportionality within the government.
Typology of political system. We distinguish between di®erent types of po-
litical systems through the discrete variable (System) which takes value "2" in
case of parliamentary system, value "1" if the President is elected by an as-
sembly, and value "0" in case of Presidential systems. Systems with unelected
executives get a "0". Systems with presidents who are elected directly or by an
3European Union member states adopting the euro have to meet the so-called Maastricht
convergence criteria, and the Stability and Growth Pact ensures that they continue to observe
them. Member states must respect two main criteria: an annual budget de¯cit no higher
than 3% of GDP and a national debt lower than 60% of GDP or approaching that value.
5electoral college (whose only function is to elect the president), in cases where
there is no prime minister, also receive a 0.4
Income distribution. We measure income inequality through the Gini Index
(Gini). The Index takes values between "0", in case of uniform income dis-
tribution where Lorenz curve equals equality line, and "1", in case of perfect
income inequality where only one person holds the totality of income. Thus,
a low Gini coe±cient indicates more equal income distribution, while a high
Gini coe±cient indicates more unequal distribution. "0" corresponds to per-
fect equality and "1" corresponds to perfect inequality. We took data based
on disposable income 5 based on households as unity of analysis. Although we
consider high quality data, concerns about the coverage of the data still hold.
In particular, it is not always clear whether in-kind incomes are included or
not in the calculation of income.6.
Electoral rule. As it will be better explained in the next paragraph, in our
analysis we will split our original sample into two sub-samples according to
the electoral rule holding in each country. We are able to do this thanks to the
information provided by the variable (Prop), a dummy for proportional elec-
toral rule that takes value "1" or "0" in case of proportional or majoritarian
electoral rule, respectively. In particular, Prop takes value "1" if candidates
are elected based on the votes received by their party and/or if the sources
speci¯cally call the system "proportional representation" and "0" otherwise.7
4In systems with both a prime minister and a president, the Database of Political Insti-
tutions (DPI) from which this measure is taken, considers the following factors to categorize
the system. a) Veto power: president can veto legislation and the parliament needs a su-
permajority to override the veto. b) Appoint prime minister: president can appoint and
dismiss prime minister and / or other ministers. c) Dissolve parliament: president can dis-
solve parliament and call for new elections. d) Mentioning in sources: if the sources mention
the president more often than the Prime Minister then this serves as an additional indicator
to call the system presidential. The system is presidential if (a) is true, or if (b) and (c) are
true. If no information or ambiguous information on (a), (b), (c), then (d) holds. Countries
in which the legislature elects the chief executive are parliamentary (2), with the following
exception: if that assembly or group cannot easily recall him (if they need a 2/3 vote to
impeach, or must dissolve themselves while forcing him out) then the system gets a "1".
5The de¯nition of disposable income corresponds to that speci¯ed by the Canberra Group
(2001) which represents the reference point in the developing standards on conceptual and
practical issues related to the production of income distribution statistics.
6Often some in-kind incomes are covered but not home production are included. Some-
times non-labour incomes are asked in one question that lumps together transfers and income
from property. Source: WIID2.
7This de¯nition holds except if the Legislative Indices of Electoral Competitiveness
(LIEC) provided by DPI is 4 or lower (No legislature; Unelected legislature; Elected leg-
62.3 Demographical variables
We use four demographic variables in order to capture their in°uence on the
level of government spending. In particular, we will focus on two demographic
features characterizing government spending decisions: age composition and
geographical distribution.
Country size. We proxied it by total population (Pop). This measure is
based on the de facto de¯nition of population, which counts all residents re-
gardless of legal status or citizenship 8. We include this variable in order to
control for potential economies of scale in the provision of public goods.
Urbanisation. The degree of urbanization within a country is proxied by
the share of population, as a percentage of the total population, living in areas
de¯ned as urban in each country (Urbpop). Given that the provision of a local
public good is easier and more e±cient in cities we expect Urbpop and Govcon
to be linked by a positive relationship.
Dependency ratio. A good measure to proxy for the extent of the economi-
cally dependent part of the population to the productive part is normally given
by the fraction of the population that is "65" or older (Pop65). We include this
variable in the empirical analysis because it is reasonable to assume a higher
share of elderly people to positive e®ect government consumption through their
direct in°uence on pensions, monetary transfers and health services.
Working age population. We take into account also the fraction of pop-
ulation (as percentage of the total population) with age between 15 and 64
(Pop1564) in order to control for the possibility of this group of people to be
addressed a di®erent type of public good with respect to that demanded by
older people.
islature with one candidate; One party, with multiple candidates). In this case a "NA" is
reported. Source: Database of Political Institutions.
8Except for refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum, who are generally
considered part of the population of their country of origin.
72.4 Other control variables
Following some important results stemming from the theoretical and the empir-
ical literature, we add a number of control variables which are usually trusted
to in°uence government consumption. We believe government spending deci-
sions to be driven by either economic, legal and social characteristics. We will
consider either internal and external economic factors, such us the level of de-
velopment proxied by real GDP per capita at constant 2000 US$ (Gdppc) and
the volume of trade transactions (Trade). We expect government consump-
tion to increase with the level of development while the relationship between
trade openness and Govcon are less straightforward. Although the literature
has extensively analyzed the link between these two important macroeconomic
variables, it is important to check whether the relationship between size of gov-
ernment and openness to trade is due to direct or indirect factors. Following
this argument, on the one hand we control whether a higher degree of trade
openness, proxied by the sum of exports and imports of goods and services
measured as a share of GDP, has a direct impact on government consumption.
On the other hand, following the argument addressed by Rodrik (1998), we
also check whether governments actually mitigate the potential negative e®ects
due to the presence of external risk associated to trade transactions through
government spending. To do this we introduce a measure that captures the
e®ect of terms of trade volatility (Voltot) 9 on Govcon and an interaction
variable Trade*Voltot, resulting from the multiplication of Trade by Voltot,
that allows us to disentangle the "direct" role played by a greater volume of
trade transactions and the role played by external risk in e®ecting the size of
government.
We model the in°uence of social and legal factors on government consump-
tion by including an index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization and an index of
civil liberties, labeled as Ethno and Civillib respectively. The former index is
the average value of ¯ve di®erent indices of ethnolinguistic fractionalization 10
9Following Rodrik (1998) we choose the volatility of terms of trade as a proxy for the
degree of exposure to external risk. Voltot is calculated as the standard deviation of (log)
di®erences in terms of trade, measured as the ratio of the export price index to the cor-
responding import price index measured relative to the base year 2000 (barter terms of
trade).
10The ¯ve component indices are: (1) index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization in 1960,
which measures the probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will
not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group (the index is based on the number and size
of population groups as distinguished by their ethnic and linguistic status); (2) probability
of two randomly selected individuals speaking di®erent languages; (3) probability of two
randomly selected individuals do not speak the same language; (4) percent of the population
not speaking the o±cial language; and (5) percent of the population not speaking the most
widely used language.
8and its value ranges from "0" to "1", with higher values indicating a higher
degree of heterogeneity between individuals in a country. Following the argu-
ment in Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) we want to investigate whether
ethnical diversity in°uences government spending and if governments behave
di®erently in this respect depending on their institutional sets.11 The second
index is the index of civil liberties provides by the Freedom House (Civillib).12
This measure ranges from "1" to "7" where higher values are associated with
lower levels of civil liberties. Although we might expect countries with higher
level of civil liberties to need and therefore be provided with higher level of
public goods, the political literature explains how dictators can use public
spending to maintain consensus on their politics. Thus, it is not straightfor-
ward to predict the behavior of this variable. Moreover, we take control for
the political-economy argument on the relevance of electoral-business-cycles
on government spending by including the variable Yrsend which measures the
years left in the current term of chief executive.13 According to Persson and
Tabellini (2003) there is evidence of countries with majoritarian electoral rules
to be associated with pre-electoral spending cuts, while countries with propor-
tional electoral rules are characterize by expansions of spending both before
and after elections.
11Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) study focuses on the role of ethnic fragmentation on
the level and composition of public spending in U.S. cities. They conclude that more ethni-
cally diverse jurisdictions in the United States have higher spending and higher de¯cits/debt
per capita, and devote lower shares of spending to core public goods like education and roads.
12The ratings process is based on a checklist of 15 civil liberties questions. The civil
liberties questions are grouped into four subcategories: Freedom of Expression and Belief
(4 questions), Associational and Organizational Rights (3), Rule of Law (4), and Personal
Autonomy and Individual Rights (4). Raw points are awarded to each of these questions
on a scale of 0 to 4, where 0 points represents the smallest degree and 4 points the greatest
degree of rights or liberties present. The highest number of points that can be awarded to
the civil liberties checklist is 60 (or a total of up to 4 points for each of the 15 questions).
The total number of points awarded to civil liberties checklists determines the civil liberties
ratings. Each point total corresponds to a rating of 1 through 7, with 1 representing the
highest and 7 the lowest level of freedom.
13The number of years left in current term of chief executive is scored "0" in an election
year and (n ¡ 1) in the year after an election, where n is the length of the term. Source:
Database of Political Institutions (DPI).
9Table 1: List of variables and sources.
Variable Description Source
Govcon General government ¯nal consump-
tion expenditure (% of GDP)
WDI 2005
Gini Gini index (ranging from 0 to 1) WIID2
Herfgov Her¯ndahl Index for Government DPI
Prop Dummy for proportional representa-
tion? (1 if yes, 0 if no)
DPI
System Typology of political system: Parlia-
mentary (2), Assembly-elected Presi-
dent (1), Presidential (0)
DPI
Gdppc Log of GDP per capita (constant 2000
US$)
WDI 2005
Pop1564 Population ages 15-64 (% of total) WDI 2005
Pop65 Population ages 65 and above (% of
total)
WDI 2005
Pop Log of total population WDI 2005
Urbpop Urban population (% of total) WDI 2005
Trade Exports plus imports (% of GDP) WDI 2005
Voltot (Lag) Standard deviation of (log) dif-
ferences in terms of trade
Authors' calculation
Trade*Voltot (Lag) Interaction term between
volatility of terms of trade and trade
openness
Authors' calculation
Civillib Civil Liberties Freedom House
Yrsend Years left in Current Term DPI
Ethno Ethnolinguistic fractionalization La Porta et al.
Oecd Dummy variable taking value 1 for
OECD countries, 0 otherwise
Authors' calculation
Africa Dummy variable taking value 1 for
African countries, 0 otherwise
Authors' calculation
America Dummy variable taking value 1 for
Latin America and Caribbeans, 0 oth-
erwise
Authors' calculation
Easteurope Dummy variable taking value 1 for
East European countries, 0 otherwise
Authors' calculation
103 Descriptive statistics and predictions
In this paragraphs we propose a simple and informative analysis of the vari-
ables re°ecting country constitutional characteristics and income distribution,
either over time and across countries, and we preliminarily investigate on their
relationship with government consumption.
Figure 2 shows that Gini Index has slowly increased in OECD countries.
This result suggests that the di®erences between upper and lower income
classes are increasing notwithstanding welfare spending and redistributive pub-
lic spending. Comparing ¯gure 2 and ¯gure 3 we also ¯nd income distribution
to behave di®erently between OECD countries and the whole country sample.
The data show that in the last years income inequality is slowly decreasing
worldwide.14 Nonetheless, given that these countries have (on average) a higher
level of income inequality with respect to OECD countries, we can reasonably
assume that Gini Index is not decreasing worldwide. Figure 4 suggests an in-
verse relationship between government spending and income inequality, in the
sense that in most countries public expenditure rose more quickly during the
70s, when income inequality was generally declining, than during the 80s and
the 90s, when inequality started to increase. The ¯nding of an inverse relation-
ship between Govcon and Gini is also con¯rmed by the negative correlation
coe±cient reported in table 2.
Figure 5 shows the relation between government consumption and Herfgov.
This plot seems to con¯rm the result discussed in the literature according to
which, ceteris paribus, the higher the fragmentation within the parties that
support the government the higher public spending. In fact, an increase in
government fragmentation implies that the government needs to target public
spending on a wider range of supporting parties which are expected to represent
a more heterogeneous share of the population. Hence, government spending
increases.
Figure 6 indicates that government consumption is higher in parliamentary
rather than in presidential systems. Most of the literature on the outcome of
democracies, and in particular Lijphart (1999), shows that in parliamentary
systems decisions on spending are typically supported by overweighted coali-
tions. The obvious consequence is that such decisions contain bene¯ts for a
wide range of interests. On the contrary, in presidential systems the power of
parliament on budget decisions is typically limited by presidential veto-power
and this helps in reducing public spending.
Table 3 brie°y presents our predictions on the behavior of the main de-
14This divergence might be due to the availability of few observations on Gini in developing
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Figure 6: Government consumption and political system.
14Table 2: Pairwise correlation between main variables.
Gov. consumption Gov. consumption
(Entire sample) (OECD sample)
Her¯ndhal index (Herfgov) -0.1372 -0.1814
Political system (System) 0.4091 0.4257
Income distribution (Gini) -0.6327 -0.5016
terminants of public spending taking into account previous results stemming
from the theoretical and the empirical literature. We would expect income
inequality (Gini) to have di®erent e®ects on government consumption depend-
ing on the type of electoral rule. In winner-take-all systems, given the relative
easiness in targeting public goods, an increase in income inequality should not
represent a major concern for the government and thus we expect it not to have
a direct impact on government consumption. In proportional systems instead,
where the government represents di®erent groups with di®erent needs, an in-
crease in Gini would be related to an increase in non-local public goods, thus
exerting pressure for an increase in public spending. Following the same rea-
soning we expect Herfgov to in°uence government consumption only in country
with proportional electoral rule, and to be negatively related to Govcon. 15
On the other hand, we expect System to in°uence government consumption
only in countries with majoritarian electoral rule, and to be positively related
to Govcon. Moreover, we would expect an increase in Pop65, Urbpop, Gdppc
and Trade, to have a positive impact on government spending, and a negative
relationship between Pop, Pop1564, Civillib, Ethno and Govcon.
Table 3: Country characteristics and government spending by electoral rule:
predictions.
Variable Majoritarian El. Rule Proportional El. Rule
Her¯ndhal index (Herfgov) ? -
Political System (System) + X
Income distribution (Gini) X +
Population (Pop) - -
Legend: "+" indicates a positive e®ect, "-" a negative e®ect, "X" no e®ect, and "?"
uncertain e®ect.
15Recall that an increase in Herfgov represents a decrease of the degree of government
fragmentation.
154 Methodology
As pointed out in the introduction we base our empirical investigation on the
determinants of government consumption on a panel data analysis. Panel data
have the advantage of taking into account both the cross-section and the time
variation of the data allowing to better control for countries heterogeneity. In
the next session we will ¯rst describe the results obtained applying the panel
Random-e®ects (RE) estimator which we prefer to the Fixed-e®ect (FE) es-
timator on the basis of a standard Hausman test.16 Then, we extend our
analysis using a di®erent model speci¯cation that takes into account the ar-
gument proposed by Rodrik (1998) and we apply an instrumental variables
(IV) estimation method that controls for potential endogeneity bias due to
the inclusion of GDP per capita (Gdppc) among the regressors. In fact, the
relationship between the level of GDP per-capita and government size might
be e®ected by the endogenous nature of the latter regressor in that the level of
development of a country e®ects the level of government consumption which,
in turn, might e®ect the level of output per-capita. In order to apply the
GLS Random-e®ects (RE) two-stage least squares (2SLS) model we ¯rst need
to run a test of endogeneity and choose e®ective instrumental variables for
the level of per-capita GDP. The choice of the instrument always represents
a tough challenge. A good instrument is a variable that is supposed to be
uncorrelated with the error term but correlated with the endogenous variable.
Following a strategy often adopted in macroeconomics empirical works, we use
the log of per-capita GDP at the beginning of the sample period to instrument
Gdppc. Moreover, following the argument proposed by Hall and Jones (1999),
as additional external instrumental variable for the level of GDP per-capita
16The speci¯city of the Random e®ect estimator is that in addition to the use of the or-
thogonality conditions that the regressors are uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic error eit
(i.e. E(Xiteit) = 0) as in the case of the Fixed-e®ects estimator, it also exploits the addi-
tional orthogonality conditions that the regressors are uncorrelated with the group-speci¯c
error ui, the "random e®ect" (i.e. E(Xitui) = 0).
The Hausman test is based on the comparison between the variance of the coe±cient esti-
mates obtained using Random and Fixed e®ects. Under the null hypothesis that the Xit
and the ¹i are not correlated both Fixed-E®ects and Random-E®ects are consistent but
Random-E®ects are more e±cient, whereas under the alternative hypothesis that Xit and
¹i are correlated, Fixed-E®ects is consistent but Random-E®ects is not. Thus, if there is
no correlation between the unobserved individual e®ect and the independent observed vari-
ables of interest, then the Random-E®ects and Fixed-E®ects should be approximately the
same. On the other hand, if the null hypothesis that the random-e®ect and ¯xed-e®ect are
approximately the same cannot be rejected, as it happens in our analysis, then the use of
the Random-E®ects estimator must be favored.
16we use the latitude of a nation's capital.17 The authors detect a high corre-
lation between distance from the equator and economic performance and in
the empirical literature there is a certain consensus regarding the fact that a
country's geographical position is connected to its economic development.18
In order to test for the presence of endogeneity, ¯rst, we run a test of endo-
geneity applying a procedure proposed by Wooldridge (2000) and secondly, we
run the Hausman test for endogeneity. Wooldridge (2000) explains that some
steps must be taken in order to test the endogeneity of a single variable as in
our case. The ¯rst step consists in estimating a reduced form of the original
model in which the variable supposed to be endogenous is regressed on all
the exogenous variable included in the structural model and on the additional
instruments. At this stage we are also able to check whether the additional
instrumental variables are actually correlated to the endogenous variable. We
are comforted with the result that the log of per-capita GDP at the begin-
ning of the sample period and the latitude of a nation's capital are strongly
statistically signi¯cant in the regression for Gdppc. This result also indicates
that these variables may represent sound instruments for the regressor Gdppc.
The second step requires to save the residuals obtained in the former step in
order to add them to the structural equation (which includes the variable sus-
pected to be endogenous). Then we test for the statistical signi¯cance of the
estimated residuals estimating the structural model using the OLS estimator.
Given that in our case the coe±cient estimate of the estimated residuals is
statistically di®erent from zero we conclude that Gdppc is indeed endogenous
thus calling for an instrumental variable estimation procedure. After conclud-
ing that Gdppc is endogenously determined with respect to Govcon we run
the Hausman test for endogeneity for two reasons. First, we want to check
the robustness of the result just obtained. Second, we want to con¯rm the
goodness of the instrumental variable chosen. The Hausman (1978, 1983) test
for endogeneity is based on the comparison between OLS and 2SLS estimates
where the ¯rst estimator is e±cient (and consistent) under the null hypothesis
that the di®erence in coe±cients is not systematic but inconsistent otherwise
and the second is consistent whether or not the hypothesis is true. For this
test a rejection of the null, as it is the case in our estimation results, indicates
that the endogenous regressor (Gdppc in our case) e®ects on the estimates
are meaningful, and this indicates that instrumental variables techniques are
required. Moreover, as explained in Wooldridge (2000), when the outcome
of the test indicates the existence of endogeneity it is reasonable also to have
17The variable Latit, developed by La Porta et al. (1999), is the absolute value of the
latitude of the country, scaled to take values between 0 and 1.
18See the works by Landes (1998), La Porta et al. (1999) and Beck et al. (2002), among
the most in°uential, for the theoretical underpinnings.
17some con¯dence in the overall set of instruments used. Nonetheless, we further
control for the validity of the external instruments included in the regression
running a test of overidentifying restrictions based on the null hypothesis that
the excluded instruments are valid instruments (i.e., uncorrelated with the er-
ror term and correctly excluded from the estimated equation). In our case,
since we cannot reject the null hypothesis, we conclude that the level of per-
capita GDP at the beginning of the sample period and the latitude of a country
are good instruments for Gdppc.
Independently of the model speci¯cation and the estimator considered, in
order to control for geographical di®erences across countries we include four
dummy variables, namely Africa and America, Middleast and Easteurope.
Moreover, we implement an estimation procedure robust to the presence of
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in order to assure correct inference on
the parameters of the model. As recommended in the empirical literature, we
also include time dummies in order to prevent contemporaneous correlation,
to control for the fact that the population may have di®erent distributions
in di®erent time periods and to control for time-related shocks that might
homogeneously e®ect all the countries included in our sample.
We will carry out our empirical analysis on three di®erent country samples.
The ¯rst sample considers the whole set of countries 19 for which we have been
able to collect data on public spending and control variables. The other two
sub-samples are obtained by splitting the original dataset according to the
dummy variable Prop which, as stated above, takes value "1" or "0" in case of
proportional or majoritarian electoral rule, respectively. This procedure allows
us to investigate on the existence of di®erences in public spending decisions
across di®erent electoral rules in force.
5 Results
The aim of this analysis is to investigate on the links between government
consumption and a country's institutional set also taking into account the
e®ect of income inequality on government spending decisions. In what follows
we show the empirical results based on two di®erent model speci¯cations and
di®erent estimation procedures.
We will ¯rst present the results obtained applying a panel random e®ect
estimator on an initial model speci¯cation before turning to the results ob-
tained using an IV estimator in order to account for potential endogeneity of
the regressor Gdppc. The second set of results is based on a variant of the ¯rst
model speci¯cation that controls for the existence of the "Rodrik e®ect".
19Countries are listed in table 6.
185.1 Panel Random-E®ects
Table 4 shows the results for the benchmark model speci¯cation estimated
using a panel random-e®ects estimator. In this analysis a part from the three
main variables of our analysis Herfgov, System and Gini, we control for a
number of country features. In particular we consider the e®ect of demographic
composition of the population such as the country size (Pop), the dependency
ratio (Pop65), the share of papulation in working age (Pop1564) and the level
of urbanization (Urbpop). We also control for macroeconomics determinants
such as openness to international trade (Trade) and the level of development
(Gdppc), and for social (Ethno) and political (Civillib, Yrsend) determinants
of government consumption. In what follows we comment on the results for
the three main variables of our analysis while we will describe the results for
the other variables included in the empirical analysis in the next paragraph.
The Her¯ndahl Index for Government (Herfgov) shows negative and sta-
tistically signi¯cant coe±cients either in the whole sample and in the sample
restricted to countries with proportional electoral rule. As stated above we
would expect the coe±cient estimate of this variable to be very relevant in
presence of a proportional election rule, given that majority rule and/or pres-
idential system lower the number of parties both in the parliament and in the
government. In particular, the negative sign of the coe±cient in column 3 is
coherent with the theoretical prediction according to which an increase in the
degree of preference homogeneity in government (an increase in Herfgov) due
to a reduction in the number of groups represented within the government,
generates a reduction in government consumption.
In the current model speci¯cation, System shows a positive and statisti-
cally signi¯cant coe±cient in the majority subsample (column 2), which is the
signi¯cant one for our analysis. An increase in this variable captures the e®ect
of the shift from a presidential to a parliamentary system passing through a
regime where the President is elected by an assembly. We expect this vari-
able to have a positive e®ect on public spending. In parliamentary systems
the government depends on parliament approval and parliaments are expected
to be more heterogeneous than governments. Furthermore, government con-
sumption is expected to be targeted on the degree of heterogeneity of the
parliament rather than on the degree of heterogeneity of the government, so
that both these e®ects go in the same direction: government spending increases
together with System. In case of proportional systems (column 3), the coef-
¯cient estimate is not statistically signi¯cant. Consider the case of a country
with proportional election rule and presidential system (i.e. Russian Federa-
tion and Brazil) where the parliament is elected following proportional rule and
the president is elected through majority rule. In this case the government is
19(typically) independent from parliament approval and the president represents
one group (or, at most, homogeneous groups) even if in the parliament there is
high fragmentation. Therefore, government consumption will be targeted on
the group(s) that support the president rather than on groups represented in
the parliament. As a consequence, the relation between System and Govcon is
less signi¯cant.
The coe±cient estimates for the Gini Index is not signi¯cant in case of
majority rule and positive and statistically signi¯cant in case of proportional
rule. In winner-take-all systems public spending is targeted on the pivotal
group that supports the government. Under the assumption that median-
voter theorem holds under majority election rule, the share of total population
represented by the pivotal group is independent of variation in income inequal-
ity in the whole population. De facto, the government care less of an increase
in inequality rather than in case of proportional electoral rule. When a pro-
portional electoral rule is in force public spending is targeted on the coalition
supporting the government, which is typically overweighed. The government
represents di®erent groups with heterogeneous preferences on public spending,
therefore if income inequality increases the government needs to take care of
more heterogenous preferences within its supporting coalition and an increase
in public expenditure occurs. Although the debate on this issue is controversial
within the literature, our results, obtained making use of a larger number of
observations with respect to previous empirical studies, con¯rm the theoretical
analyses by Metzeler and Richard (1981) and Persson and Tabellini (2000).
5.2 Panel IV
In table 5 we present the results of the panel IV model described in section
4. The signs of the estimate coe±cients for the variables Herfgov, System
and Gini are the same as in table 4 and similar in magnitude. Nonetheless,
di®erently than in table 4, we notice that for this speci¯cation the coe±cient
estimate for Herfgov turns out to be negative and statistically signi¯cant for
the majority rule subsample and positive although not statistically signi¯cant
in the entire sample. In order to clarify this unexpected outcome we run a
test to verify whether the coe±cient estimated for Herfgov over the group of
countries with proportional rule is equal to the coe±cient estimated over the
group of countries with majority electoral rule (Chow test). When we analyse
the entire sample in fact we are "pooling" together two models that predict
government spending within each group based on certain characteristics that
vary within the group. We do this under the assumption that each group's
behavior is unique. Therefore, we test whether the ¯tted models for the two
groups of countries have the same intercepts (knowing that they have similar
20and negative slope) because if the two ¯tted models have di®erent intercepts
then the positive sign for Herfgov in the complete sample might be due to the
fact that the "pooled" linear model ¯ts a line with positive slope between the
two groups of data. The outcome of the Chow-test goes in this direction in
that we reject the null hypothesis that the intercepts for the models estimated
for the two di®erent subsamples are equal.
Turning to the results on country demographic composition of the pop-
ulation, it emerges that country size (Pop), when statistically signi¯cant is
negatively correlated to public consumption.20 This result con¯rms that in
Alesina and Wacziarg (1998), according to which an increase of the popula-
tion leads to a decrease in public spending. The results on Pop65 is in line
with what we expected. When Pop65 is statistically signi¯cant, it is positively
correlated to public consumption. In particular, this relationship holds in the
subsample of countries with proportional electoral rule. This result can be ex-
plained considering that an aging population requires more public spending (in
particular for health services). On the other hand, the coe±cient is positive but
not statistically signi¯cant for the majority subsample. These divergent results
are based on the fact that in the majority subsample government spending is
supposed to be based on the preferences of the pivotal group which are inde-
pendent of the demographic composition of the population. On the contrary,
the demographic composition of the (typically) overweighed coalitions that
support the governments under proportional electoral rule counts: the higher
the share of the aging population, the higher the demand for public spending,
given that the average income of the aging population is lower that the one of
the working-age population, thus the older ones bene¯ts from redistribution
from younger people through public spending.
The contrary occurs when we focus on working age individuals. The coef-
¯cient estimate for population share aged between "15" and "64" (Pop1564)
shows negative and statistically signi¯cant coe±cient in the subsample for pro-
portional systems countries (column3) while it is not statistically signi¯cant for
the subsample of countries where representatives are elected through majority
rule. As for Pop65, in majority systems the government spending is supposed
to be independent of the demographic composition of the population. The
negative and statistically signi¯cant coe±cient proportional subsample is the
counterpart of the previous result for Pop65. In general, active individuals are
expected to require less taxation instead of more public spending.
Given the de¯nition of the variable Govcon and the theoretical results of
Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno (2002), the coe±cients for proportional
20In the previous analysis summarized in table 4, this result holds independently on the
country sample considered.
21systems and majority system diverge as we would expect. In proportional
systems public spending depends upon the demographic composition of the
population: higher aging individual share means more public spending; higher
working-age individual share means less taxation. On the contrary, the choices
in terms of public spending in majority systems are independent of demo-
graphic issues, given that such choices are fundamentally based on the pivotal
group(s) that typically represent(s) a "small" share of the whole population.
We conclude the discussion on the results for explanatory variables of demo-
graphic nature analyzing the e®ect of the level of urbanization on government
consumption. The coe±cient estimate for Urbpop shows a positive sign when it
is statistically signi¯cant. The positive sign is coherent with the argument that
local public goods are located more e±ciently in cities where costs of distance
are expected to decrease.
Per-capita GDP (Gdppc), when signi¯cant, enters with negative sign. Con-
trolling for the quality of civil liberties, we ¯nd that the estimated coe±cient
for (Civillib) is negative, as expected, in the proportional subsample.21 We
need to take into account that in most cases wealth goes hand in hand with
civil liberties. Nonetheless, the literature on politics shows that dictators use
public spending to maintain consensus on their politics but the composition
of government spending in a non-democratic environment is mainly given by
non local public goods. Although it has to be stressed that our aggregate
data do not allow us to distinguish among within-region heterogeneity and
between regions heterogeneity as in the contribution of Alesina, Baqir, and
Easterly (1999) 22, we are still able to provide an explanation of our estimated
coe±cients for the variable Ethno in table 4. In this analysis the estimated
coe±cients enter with a positive sign. This result is in line with that found in
Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) according to which a higher degree of ethnic and
linguistic fractionalization, which is typically correlated to country size, puts
an upward pressure on public consumption.
In table 4 we included the variable Trade to proxy for the degree of openness to
21Recall that an increase in the index implies a lower the level of civil liberties within a
country.
22In their paper Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) distinguish between public goods
provided at national level and public good provided at county and municipality level in the
U.S. ¯nding that the e®ect of etnolinguistic fractionalization depends on the jurisdiction level
where di®erent public goods are provided. In our case, we collect data on ethnolinguistic
fractionalization at national level. For example, we are not able to distinguish between a
country where there are two regions where there is perfect ethnic homogeneity (i.e. a region
with 100% of white people, and the other one with 100% of black people) and a country
where there are two regions heterogeneous from the point of view of ethnic fractionalization
(i.e. in both of the two regions there is the same percentage of white people and black
people.
22international trade. We ¯nd trade openness to be negatively related to govern-
ment spending. In table 5 we show the results obtained replacing the control
variable for trade openness (Trade) with a group of variables aimed at captur-
ing a more complex aspect relating trade to government spending as done by
Rodrik (1998) in his popular paper. According to the author "there exists a
robust positive relationship between government spending and trade openness
due to the role played by governments in mitigating, mostly through spending
in social security and welfare, the external risk stemming from external shocks
associated to trade". Following Rodrik's argument we add to our baseline re-
gression the variables Trade, Voltot and Trade*Voltot which represent the lag
of the ratio of trade volume over GDP, the volatility in the terms of trade and
an interaction term between these two measures respectively, where, according
to the author, the latter explanatory variable represents the "theoretically ap-
propriate measure of external risk for an open economy". While our results for
the entire sample (column 1) cannot con¯rm the argument explained above,
in that trade openness has a direct and negative e®ect on Govcon, we get
to di®erent conclusions when separating countries according to the electoral
rule in force. In fact, both in column 2 and 3 of table 5 we ¯nd the coe±-
cient for Voltot to be statistically signi¯cant, with negative sign, indicating
that the risk associated with the volatility in the terms of trade is indeed a
determinant of public expenditure in particular in countries characterized by
proportional electoral rules. We also ¯nd results in line with those in Rodrik
(1998) for the coe±cient estimate of the interaction variable independently on
the electoral rule in force in a country. The positive and statistically signi¯-
cant coe±cient estimate for Trade*Voltot indicate how it is not trade per se to
drive government consumption but the protecting behavior of the government
in its attempt to protect the economy from terms of trade risk. To summarize,
altogether our results support the view that government of economies more
exposed to trade consume a larger share of GDP in order to mitigate external
risk.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the e®ects of political, economic, demographic
and social variables on size of public expenditure in a large sample of developed
and developing countries from 1970 to 2005. We merged data from di®erent
databases obtaining a panel dataset that, although unbalanced, represents a
signi¯cant improvement with respect to the data used in previous empirical
analysis. In particular, we extended the time dimension and conducted our
analysis on yearly data improving the exploitation of the time variations of
23all the variables in our data set. In our work, controlling for the e®ect of de-
mographic composition of the population, macroeconomics and social country
features, we provide a general explanation of public spending determinants
focusing on the e®ects of di®erent institutional settings and income inequality
on government consumption.
We estimate two di®erent model speci¯cations applying a random-e®ects
panel estimator and an IV panel estimator in order to control for potential en-
dogeneity problems. Initially, we run our empirical analysis on a large sample
of countries without distinguishing between the electoral rule in force, then
we divide the original sample between countries characterized by majoritarian
and proportional electoral rule in order to emphasize how di®erences in the
electoral systems in°uence the size of government spending. Although we use
a di®erent estimation methodology, we can also compare our results with those
in Persson and Tabellini (2003) which o®ers an extensive analysis of the role
of institutional settings in determining policy-makers' decisions. We ¯nd that
in countries with proportional electoral rule an increase in the heterogeneity of
the government increases government consumption. This result is consistent
with the argument according to which an increase in the degree of preferences
homogeneity within the government coalition generates a reduction in govern-
ment consumption. The second important ¯nding relates to the e®ect of the
political system on public spending. We ¯nd that in countries with majoritar-
ian electoral rule, a shift from presidential to parliamentary system leads to an
increase in government consumption. Moreover, our analysis explains how the
link between income inequality and public spending depends upon institutional
characteristics, in particular on electoral rule. We ¯nd that while income in-
equality does not e®ect public spending decisions in countries with majoritarian
electoral rule, when a proportional electoral rule is in force, income inequality
increases together with public expenditure because the government needs to
take care of more heterogenous preferences within its supporting coalition. We
also ¯nd interesting results stemming from economic and demographic coun-
try characteristics. In particular we ¯nd that an increase in the population is
associated with a decrease in government consumption, where the same e®ects
holds also for an increase in the share of people in their working age. Instead,
an increase in the share of elderly people and of the share of population living
in urban areas leads to an increase in public spending. Moreover, controlling
for the e®ect of trade openness we are able to compare our results with other
empirical works on this topic. Our results support the view that government
of economies more exposed to trade consume a larger share of GDP in order
to mitigate external risk as discussed in Rodrik (1998).
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27Table 4: The determinants of government consumption: Panel Random-
E®ects.
(1) (2) (3)
Her¯ndhal index (Herfgov) -1.280¤¤¤ 0.893 -1.236¤¤
(0.43) (1.22) (0.50)
Political system (System) -0.132 1.149¤¤¤ -0.400
(0.29) (0.36) (0.39)
Gini index (Gini) 0.026 0.031 0.011¤
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Country size (Pop) -1.221¤¤¤ -0.906¤¤¤ -1.576¤¤¤
(0.28) (0.29) (0.39)
Dependency ratio (Pop65) 0.253¤¤ 0.634¤¤¤ 0.074
(0.11) (0.15) (0.13)
Working age population (Pop1564) 0.093 -0.124 0.094
(0.06) (0.10) (0.08)
Urbanisation (Urbpop) 0.119¤¤¤ 0.052¤¤ 0.141¤¤¤
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Trade (Trade) -0.020¤¤¤ -0.009 -0.025¤¤¤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GDP per-capita (Gdppc) 0.040 0.415 0.128
(0.41) (0.52) (0.60)
Years left in current term (Yrsend) -0.066 0.083 -0.124¤
(0.05) (0.16) (0.07)
Civil liberties (Civillib) 0.045 -0.120 0.047
(0.12) (0.33) (0.17)
Ethnolinguistic (Ethno) 2.892 3.079¤¤ 6.299¤¤
(1.83) (1.33) (2.55)
R-squared 0.54 0.67 0.58
No. of Obs. 917 227 614
N. of Groups 98 40 57
Note: Dependent variable is government consumption as percentage of GDP (Govcon).
Estimation method is pamel random-e®ects. Column (1) shows the results obtained using
the entire sample, columns (2) and (3) report the results for the majority and proportional
electoral rule sub-samples, respectively. ***,**,* denote signi¯cance at the 1, 5 and 10
percent levels respectively. Time dummies included but not reported.
28Table 5: The determinants of government consumption: Panel IV and "Rodrik
e®ect".
(1) (2) (3)
Herfgov 0.219 -3.635¤¤ -4.054¤¤¤
(0.46) (1.67) (0.75)
System 0.078 2.507¤¤¤ 0.746
(0.38) (0.45) (0.72)
Gini 0.018 0.048 0.085¤¤
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Pop -1.228¤¤¤ 0.506 -0.212
(0.45) (0.40) (0.26)
Pop65 0.419¤¤¤ -0.005 0.349¤¤¤
(0.13) (0.21) (0.10)
Pop1564 0.120 -0.026 -0.366¤¤¤
(0.08) (0.13) (0.10)
Urbpop 0.177¤¤¤ 0.051 0.108¤¤¤
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Trade -0.026¤¤¤ 0.011 -0.010
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Voltot -0.016 -0.113¤¤ -0.218¤¤
(0.03) (0.05) (0.09)
Trade*Voltot 0.035 0.201¤ 0.266¤
(0.06) (0.11) (0.15)
Gdppc -1.785¤ -2.002¤¤ 0.502
(1.01) (0.99) (0.50)
Yrsend -0.112¤¤ 0.013 -0.193
(0.06) (0.16) (0.15)
Civillib -0.104 -0.314 -0.699¤¤
(0.14) (0.33) (0.28)
Ethno 0.123 2.095 -0.878
(2.51) (1.71) (1.36)
R-squared 0.55 0.79 0.69
No. of Obs. 691 176 468
N. of Groups 71 26 43
Note: Dependent variable is government consumption as percentage of GDP. Estimation
method is panel IV where Gdppc has been instrumented with its own value at the
beginning of each 5 years sub-period and with country' s capital latitude. Column (1)
shows the results obtained using the entire sample, columns (2) and (3) report the results
for the majority and proportional electoral rule sub-samples, respectively. ***,**,* denote
signi¯cance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. ***,**,* denote signi¯cance at
the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. Time dummies included but not reported.
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Bosnia & Herzegovina Israel Romania
Botswana Italy Russia
Bulgaria Kazakhstan Slovak Republic
Canada Kenya Slovenia
Chile Korea Somalia
China,P.R.: Mainland Kyrgyz Republic South Africa
Colombia Latvia Spain
Costa Rica Lesotho Sweden
Croatia Lithuania Switzerland
Cyprus Luxembourg Tajikistan
Czech Republic Macedonia, FYR Turkey
Denmark Mexico US
Dominican Republic Moldova Ukraine
Ecuador Nepal United Kingdom
El Salvador Netherlands Uzbekistan
Estonia New Zealand Venezuela, Rep. Bol.
Finland Nicaragua
France Nigeria
30Table 7: Electoral rules and forms of government.
MAJ and PRES PROP and PRES MAJ and PARL PROP and PARL
Belarus Armenia Botswana Australia
Chile Costa Rica Canada Austria
Kazakhstan Croatia France Belgium
Kenya Cyprus Lesotho Bulgaria
Tajikistan Dominican Republic Macedonia, FYR Czech Republic
Ukraine Ecuador Nepal Denmark
United States El Salvador New Zealand Finland






















Note: PARL = parliamentary system; PRES = presidential system; MAJ = majoritarian
electoral rule and PROP = proportional electoral rule
31Table 8: Country characteristics and constitutions.
MAJ PROP PRES PARL
(Prop=0) (Prop=0) (System=0) (System=2)
Gdppc 8.38 8.62 7.43 9.23
(1.73) (1.19) (1.13) (1.14)
Trade 67.57 75.92 67.03 79.15
(32.96) (39.97) (34.07) (41.97)
Pop65 9.14 9.90 5.74 12.19
(4.64) (4.86) (3.40) (4.03)
Civillib 2.39 2.11 3.51 1.60
(1.67) (1.23) (1.60) (0.97)
Note: Means and standard deviations (in parenthesis) of some prominent policy
determinants by political regimes ("PARL" parliamentary; "PRES" presidential) and
electoral rules ("MAJ" majoritarian; "PROP" proportional).
Table 9: Descriptive statistics.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Govcon 4830 16.565 7.440 2.154 94.237
Gini 2021 38.780 11.079 15.900 73.900
Herfgov 3996 0.804 0.288 0.002 1.077
System 4748 0.770 0.902 0.000 2.000
Pop 6505 15.204 2.054 9.903 20.977
Pop65 5883 6.057 4.033 0.000 18.997
Pop1564 5883 58.476 6.548 45.347 73.599
Urbpop 6689 49.160 24.490 2.391 100.000
Trade 5038 75.159 43.957 1.531 330.596
Voltot(t-1) 2592 10.073 11.660 0.000 135.881
Voltot*Trade(t-1) 2435 5.830 6.973 0.000 71.336
Gdppc 5172 7.486 1.549 3.799 10.901
Civillib 5356 3.831 1.919 1.000 7.000
Yrsend 3596 2.047 1.534 -1.000 9.000
Ethno 5542 0.336 0.301 0.000 1.000
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